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FIRST ROUGH DRAFT OF A RESEARCH REPORT 
1. This draft research report explains the desirability for 
drafting a seventh bill to add to the present bundle of six bills 
for the MEC, Welfare. The proposed bill will give the MEC power to 
make grants to community development organizations and to local 
governments. It will also require to use the MEC's long-dormant 
power to impose performance conditions on a subsidy to a welfare 
provider, and to monitor and control subsidized welfare providers 
and their programmes. 
2. The problem arises in the context of a Welfare Department 
seeking to transform itself. The essence of the change lies in the 
shift from an older paradigm of welfare as providing grants-in-aid 
of the physically or socially disabled or vulnerable in an 
apartheid-ridden society, and the current paradigm, of 
developmental welfare in a democratic society. To begin those 
processes of transformation, the Department has in train six 
transformatory bills. 1 In drafting these bills, two problems 
became evident: (1) they broke the envelope of the present laws 
authorizing funding of NGOs for welfare programmes; and (2) they 
demanded transformations in the functioning and probably the 
structure of many of the NGOs presently conducting welfare 
programmes subsidized by the Department. The bill here proposed 
will aim to address the MEC' s role in dealing with these two 
problems through the provision of funds. 
3 . Following a problem- solving methodology, this Report first 
discusses the social problem and the problematic behaviours which 
comprise it that the new bill aims to address; second, the 
explanations for those problematic behaviours; and third, the kinds 
of provisions required in the proposed bill to alter those 
behaviours. 
I. THE DUAL DIFFICULTIES: 
EXPANDED PROGRAMMES AND INADEQUATE CONTROLS 
4. This section discusses (1) the three social problems at which 
the proposed bill aims: the MEC's constrained powers to make grants 
for topics that the new paradigm places on the welfare agenda, to 
make grants to local government, and to induce changes in welfare 
NGOs; and (2) identifies the MEC, local governments and welfare 
Concerning the aged, RSWis, delegation to local government, street children, disabled access, and 
o.evc>lopmentai welfare (or the economic empowerment of the poor and vulnerable). 
NGOs as the role occupants whose behaviours constitute the 
difficulty. 
A. THE SOCIAL PROBLEMS ADDRESSED 
5. The first problem addressed concerns the necessity for new 
programmes relevant to the new, developmental welfare paradigm (for 
example, aiding emergent entrepreneurs and organizing community 
economically productive activities) . At present, the Welfare 
Department carries out almost no activities in this area. 
6. Second, the new welfare paradigm calls for maximum feasible 
devolution of welfare functions to local authorities. Inevitably, 
that will require some funding of those authorities by the 
Provincial department. That has not yet occurred on a significant 
scale. As the Provincial Department provides more funding to local 
authorities, however, it will need to ensure transparency, 
accountability and community participation in the decision-making 
process regarding their use. 
7. Third, to carry out the new functions of welfare requires that 
the MEC exercise more supervision and control over the NGOs through 
which the MEC carries out the Department's mission. Existing NGOs 
have mostly conducted their programmes for many years. They 
continue to carry them out in the same way. For example, four 
years after the adoption of a democratic constitution, assistance 
to old age homes continues its apartheid-driven discrimination 
against black frail aged. In relative terms, it seems that a white 
older person has about sixty four times as much chance of having 
the State support him or her in a Welfare Department-supported NGO-
operated shelter as does a black older person. 2 Apparently, the 
responsible NGOs have not transformed themselves. 
8. Legislation usually cannot directly address the superficial 
manifestations of the social problem that excited the demand for 
its enactment. Legislation can only address behaviours. As their 
first task, those proposing new legislation must translate the 
social problem as it appears on its surface into the behaviours 
that constitute it. 
B. WHOSE AND WHAT BEHAVIOURS? 
9. These dual problems arise out of the behaviours of three social 
actors. At present, the MEC subsidizes some welfare activities, 
but precious few developmental ones despite the present 
This figure is approximate. At present, in absolute terms, the Department 
supports 16 white old people in government-supported shelters as blacks. With four 
times as many blacks as whites in Gauteng, relatively a white older person's chances 
of entering a home with governmental assistance is 64 times (i.e., 16 x 4) that of a 
black older persons' chance. That does not factor in the fact that at present the level 
of funding for white older persons in shelters runs about twice or more the level of 
funding for black older persons in shelters. 
transformational thrust of welfare policy. Local authorities have 
not undertaken new welfare responsibilities. Despite exhortation 
of NGOs by the MEC, they have a long ways to go towards 
transformation. 
10. Welfare policy points towards developmental welfare, with all 
its implications for pointing welfare towards helping its clients 
into productive economic activity, and towards decentralized 
delegation of welfare functions to regional and local units. That 
policy points towards the transformation of the NGOs who carry out 
welfare functions by operating specific programmes. These 
policies, however, remain largely embedded in White Papers and 
other policy documents. Thus far, they apparently have had little 
effect on the ground. Why the gap between policy and action? 
II. EXPLANATIONS 
11. Law that addresses only the superficial manifestations of a 
social problem tends merely to poultice symptoms. Competent 
legislation attempts so far as possible to address the causes of 
the behaviours that comprise that problem. Why these problematic 
behaviours of the MEC, local authorities and NGOs that conduct 
welfare programmes? 
A. THE LAW AS EXPLANATION 
12. A new law always changes old laws. New laws arise to change 
the causes of socially problematic behaviours. It follows that one 
of the 'causes' of the problematic behaviours here at issue must 
consist of the existing legal framework within which the three role 
occupants function. 
13. Two of the behaviours involved -- the MEC's failure to fund 
developmental activities, and to subsidize local government welfare 
functions, find partial explanations in the Social Assistance Act, 
1992, as amended, section 5. As we understand it, that section 
constitutes the source of MEC's power to make grants to the welfare 
organizations that carry out welfare programmes. That section, 
however, limits the MEC's power to make grants for welfare 
purposes, both with respect of the purpose of the grant, and to 
what sorts of recipients. 
14. First, section 5 limits grants to seven areas. 3 These all 
reflect the older paradigm of welfare as a device for supplying a 
safety net for people who without subsidization or actual, physical 
care cannot live in the society. Without straining the sense of 
the words, on their face none direct the MEC or even permit the MEC 
to make grants that look to aid people disabled only by poverty. 
"The Minister may ... out of moneys appropriated by the Provincial Legislature concerned for that 
purpose, make financial awards to" {i) family care; (ii) care of the aged; (iii} social security; (iv) care 
of the disabled; (v) alcohol and drug dependency; (vi) care of the offender; and (vii) the care of mentally or 
psychiatrically disabled persons. 
So far as appears, the MEC cannot make a grant to help emergent 
entrepreneurs, or to help organize poor people into group 
enterprises. Without that power, developmental welfare policies 
may die-aborning. 4 
15. Second, section 5 limits the possible grantees of funds to 
'welfare organizations,' defined as a welfare organization 
registered or deemed registered in terms of the National Welfare 
Act, 197 8. That would seem to exclude a local government. 
Although the Constitution permits the delegation of provincial 
welfare responsibilities to local governments, the Constitution is 
not self-enabling. In the face of section 5, it seems at least 
questionable whether the MEC today has power to grant a subsidy for 
welfare purposes to a local authority. 
16. The third behaviour involved the failure of NGOs to 
transform their structures and processes -- also find a partial 
explanation in the surrounding legal framework. Section 5 of the 
Social Assistance Act, 1992, as amended, empowers the MEC to make 
grants to welfare organizations. Nothing in that forbids the MEC 
from making those subsidies on conditions. Moreover, if the Head 
of Department believes that a beneficiary "misspends his grant" or 
for any reason that the HOD "deems expedient", section 8 empowers 
the HOD to "suspend payment" of the grant, or pay it over to some 
other person on behalf of the grant's beneficiaries. The 
regulations made under the Act reinforce that power. 5 
17. The MEC, therefore, has considerable power to discipline NGOs. 
No law, however, empowers the MEC to demand changes in the 
structure, process or methods of work of an NGO, save at the time 
of making the grant. New law or subsidiary legislation requiring 
performance subsidies and empowering the MEC to impose those 
changes upon a welfare provider may resolve the problem. 
18. Finally, no law or subsidiary legislation affirmatively 
requires or empowers the MEC to undertake either of these three 
tasks. Without such a law, whether the MEC pursues the 
developmental welfare paradigm, or makes a grant to a local 
government, or seeks transformation in how an NGO functions, 
remains up to the individual MEC. 
B. NON-LEGAL EXPLANATIONS 
19. The Law of the Reproduction of Institutions6 holds that absent 
Read strictly, section 5 does not authorise some programmes that the welfare department has carried 
on for years. For example, nothing in section 5 authorises grants specifically for creches, or for street 
children. (It does permit grants for 'family care'). Nothing permits the MEC to make grants specifically in 
aid of women. 
Requlations N. R. 373, 1 March 1996, sec. 41. 
6 See Ann Seidman and Robert B. Seidman, State and Law in the Development Process (Macmillan, 1994), Ch. 
2. 
• 
an initiating change undertaken by government, institutions 
ineluctably change over time. but not necessarily down the road 
towards which government policies point. Actors behave by making 
choices within an arena of legal and non-legal, subjective and 
objective constraints and resources: The law, an actor's 
opportunity and capacity to behave in a particular way, knowledge 
of the applicable law, incentives, process for deciding how to 
behave, and ideology. Those factors make some actions possible or 
easier, and others impossible or more difficulty. One can explain 
behaviours of each set of the relevant social actors -- the MECs, 
the local government authorities, and the NGOs -- by explicating 
the non-legal factors that shape them. The proposed bill can only 
seek to change those three sets of problematic behaviours by 
changing those causal factors. By the same token, unless the 
bill's provisions do successfully change those causal factors, that 
the actors' behaviours will not likely change. 
20. In Gauteng, to date, whatever else has changed, most of the 
relevant elements in the legal and non-legal environment within 
which the MEC, local authorities and NGOs deal with subsidies have 
not changed. In this initial draft, suffice it to say that, as a 
result of the democratic elections, governmental policies, and the 
ideology of the MEC, some officials in Welfare, and some local 
councilors have changed; their ideology has stimulated their 
efforts to seek change in the framework which funnelled welfare 
along lines determined by the old paradigm. That includes changes 
in all the constraints and resources that determine the behaviours 
of people in the welfare community. Assuming the Department 
agrees to proceed with the bill, this report ultimately will have 
to examine all the possible categories of non-legal factors (ie the 
ROCCIPI checklist) to ensure it identifies all the causal factors 
that have influenced all the three sets of actors' behaviours. In 
the solution section, then, it will have to show that the proposed 
bill's provisions logically really do seem likely to alter or 
eliminate the causes identified. Based on the research reports 
already prepared for the other six bills, however, the proposed 
bill would probably include the following provisions. 
III. THE PROPOSED BILL 
21. The MEC has already set in train six bills aiming at 
transformation of the welfare sector. 7 Two of the new bills will 
resolve two of the three social problems earlier identified. The 
projected Economic Empowerment of the Poor Act will give the MEC 
the authority that he needs to engage in certain development-
related activities. The Delegation of Welfare Functions to Local 
Authorities will give him power to disburse funds to local 
authorities; the Regional Social Welfare Institutes Act, power to 
We note that the Social Assistance Act, Section 5, constitutes a national law. To the extent that 
section 5 may constrain the MEC to making grants in accordance with the new paradigm, the national Act may 
require amendment. We sugqest that the MEC take legal advice from a South African-qualified lawyer on the 
issue, whether the new provincial legislation now in draft requires amendin~J the national Act. 
.. 
do so to RSWis. Together wit the other six bills, these will make 
a long step towards transforming the institutional framework within 
which the former regime imprisoned the old welfare regulatory 
regime. 
22. These six bills, however, leave unsolved the social problems 
involving the MEC's authority over most welfare NGOs' structure, 
processes and methods of work. The new Aged persons Act will 
empower him to induce transformations in a NGOs, as will the Street 
Children Shelters Act. The MEC needs, however, a broader, more 
general power to address the problems of transformation in NGOs 
besides those engaged in operating street shelters and programmes 
for assistance to the aged. 
2 3. For lack of time, we do not canvass alternative possible 
solutions here. Instead, we suggest one possible solution. We do 
urge that before settling on this solution, further research seek 
to discover alternative possible solutions to contrast and compare 
with the one here put forward. 
24. At this time, ware unclear whether this proposal ought to find 
expression as a new, provicial statute, subsidiary legislation 
under the Social Assistance Act, 1992, or otherwise; we leave that 
for later determination by lawyers better qualified than we to deal 
with South African law. Whatever its form, we propose a new law 
giving the MEC power to induce necessary transformations in 
existing welfare NGOs and how they conduct business. 
25. That power, we suggest, will hinge on four features. First, 
the MEC will have a general power to require all NGOs who receive 
a welfare grant to adhere to stipulated performance conditions. 
That will give the MEC power to order necessary changes in NGO 
structure, processes and methods of work. 
26. Second, the proposed Act will give the MEC power to monitor an 
NGO and to order necessary changes in a NGO's structure, processes 
and methods of work as revealed in the MEC' s moni taring and 
evaluation of the NGO. 
27. Third, the new Act will give the MEC power to implement the 
conditions or recommendations made. In case the NGO fails to meet 
the conditions laid down by law, the performance conditions of the 
subsidy, or to carry out a recommendation of the MEC, the MEC will 
have the power to revoke a subsidy to an NGO. 
28. Fourth, in aid of the MEC's power to require changes in NGOs, 
and to protect welfare clients in the event the MEC revokes a 
subsidy, the new Act will give the MEC power to take over the 
assets of an NGO whose subsidy the MEC must cancel, using them for 
the benefit of the clients of the programme the NGO had 
responsibility under the performance subsidy to conduct. 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
29. The new welfare paradigm finds itself sharply constraints by 
the existing law concerning the MEC 1 s powers. The proposed 
1 seventh bill 1 will empower the MEC to use his powers over 
subsidies to recommend changes to NGOs, and to make sure that 
either the NGO makes the changes, or no longer receive a 
departmental subsidy. 
